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Strict vs. Substantial Compliance...

The Rocky Road of Maryland Wiretap Law
A Comment on Recent Maryland Wiretap Decisions
by Michael McDonough

In the landmark case of State v. Siegel,
266 Md. 256, 292, A.2d 86 (1972),

(hereinafter cited as Siegel), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that "[T]he
[Maryland Wiretap] statute sets up a
strict procedure that must be followed
and we will not abide any deviation,
no matter how slight, from the prescribed path." Id. at 274, 292 A.2d at

95. Applying this standard, the Court
suppressed evidence from a wiretap in
which the order of authorization did
not include provisions as to "whether
or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described
communication has been first obtained," 18 U.S.C. 2518(4) (e) (1976).
The court stated that interception
would "be conducted in such a way as
to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception" Id. 2518(5). 18 U.S.C.
2510 et seq. (1976) required that
every order of authorization contain
such provisions. The scrutiny applied
by the court in Siegel has become
known as the strict compliance standard.
Just two years later, Judge Charles
Moylan, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Spease and Ross v. State, 21
Md. App. 269, 319 A.2d 560 (1974),
aff'd 275 Md. 88, 383 A.2d 284 (1975)

(hereinafter cited as Spease and Ross),
applied a more lenient substantial compliance standard. Spease and Ross questioned whether the police, who had
intercepted conversations pursuant to
a legally sufficient order, had also adequately minimized the interception of
non-pertinent conversations in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) (1976).
Judge Moylan noted:
It was in this regard that the
Court of Appeals said in the Siegel
case: 'The statute sets up a strict
procedure that must be followed
and we will not abide any deviation, no matter how slight from
the prescribed path,' and we said
in the Lee case: '... the procedure

required by the federal act must
be strictly followed and... a substantial compliance [is] insufficient.' We are not here faced,
however, with the legitimacy of
the authorizing order itself and do
not, therefore, feel that language
pertinent thereto is necessarily
controlling when reviewing every
subsidiary action taken in execution of an order which does meet
all constitutional requirements.
Spease and Ross 21 Md. App. at 275,
319 A.2d at 564.
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That standard was also applied to service of inventory in the same case.
The Court of Appeals, reviewing Spease
and Ross, affirmed, also applying the
substantial compliance standard. Id. at 99,
338 A.2d at 290-291.
The ultimate result of these two
cases appeared to be clear. The Court
would apply the strict compliance standard
in analyzing the legality of the authorization for and issuance of the wiretap
order, while applying the more lenient
substantial compliance standard to analysis
of the execution and post-execution
procedures.
In 1977, the Maryland Legislature
enacted the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md. Code
Ann C.J. §§10-401 et. seq' (1980 Rep.

vol.) (hereinafter cited as The Wiretapping Act).
Any aggrieved person may move to
suppress wiretap evidence on the
grounds that:
(i) The communication was
unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) The order of authorization
under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its
face, or was not obtained or
issued in strict compliance
with this subtitle; or
(iii) The interception was not
made in conformity with the
order of authorization. Id. at
§10-408(h)(i)(i).
The statute simply codifies the law as
developed by the Court in Siegel, and
Spease and Ross. Under The Wiretapping
Act, strict compliance is the standard
in determining the legal sufficiency of
the application, supporting affidavits,
and order. Id. at 10-408 (h)(i)(ii). If
these documents do not meet the
stringent test of Siegel, suppression is
the remedy. The enunciation of this
strict compliance language is conspicuous in its absence from The Wiretapping Act, Id. at 10-408 (h)(i) concerning
illegal interceptions and concerning
the manner in which the authorization is executed Id. at 10-408 (h)(i)(iii).
The only rational conclusion is that
the Legislature intended to codify the
pronouncements of the Court in Siegel
and Spease and Ross.

In Poore v. State, 39 Md. App. 44, 384
A.2d 103 (1978) (hereinafter cited as
Poore) Chief Judge Richard Gilbert,
speaking for the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals took the first in a series of steps which resulted in the
uneven path that the wiretap case law
has traversed. Although the issues,
minimization and service of inventory, were the same as those raised in
Spease and Ross, Judge Gilbert postulated a new rationale for the same
result:
At first glance Spease appears to

conflict with Siegel. A careful reading of both cases makes it transpicuous that Siegel is directed to
pre-intercept and intercept conditions. As to these two (2) happenings, not the slightest deviation
from the statute will be sanctioned. On the other hand, Spease
indicates that when postintercept events are brought into
question, the Court looks to the
facts so as to ascertain whether
there has been substantial compliance with the post-intercept
provisions of the act and whether
there has been actual prejudice to
the defendant. Id. at 53, 384 A.2d
at 110.

That this statement is a radical departure from the holding in Spease and Ross
is underscored by Judge Gilbert's own
words. He categorically states "Spease
and Ross v. State... distinguishes between
pre-order compliance and post-order
compliance." Id. at 52,384 A.2d at 109
(emphasis added). This statement
accurately categorizes Spease and Ross.
The pre-intercept, intercept, postintercept analysis of Spease and Ross,
and Siegel, explicated by Judge Gilbert

in Poore, has generated more confusion and insecurity than any other
single Maryland decision in the area
of electronic surveillance.
At first glance, the addition of the
requirement of strict compliance during the intercept stage of a wiretap
does not appear to be a radical change
in the prior law. Closer examination,
however, reveals that such a requirement significantly reduces the possibilities for application of the substantial
compliance standard and is inconsistent
with the application of that lesser
standard to minimization.
The three-phase analysis ostensibly applied in Poore, cannot survive
careful scrutiny even in its own context. The two major issues in Poore
were minimization and service of inventory. Service of inventory is to be
made "within a reasonable time but
not later than 90 days after the termination of an order or extensions
thereof." The Wiretapping Act, at 10405(g)(4). Thus, service of inventory
is clearly a post-intercept matter governed, under the three-phase framework, by the standard of substantial
compliance. But what of minimization? Both federal and Maryland law
require that interceptions be conducted
"...in such a way as to minimize..."
18 U.S.C. 2518(5) (1976), The WiretappingAct, 10-408 (e). It seems clear,
then, that minimization occurs during the intercept stage. Under Judge
Gilbert's three-phase framework, strict
compliance is clearly required. Yet in
both Spease and Ross, and Poore, a substantial compliance standardwas utilized. Significantly, Judge Gilbert does not even
attempt to fit minimization into his
framework. He simply follows Spease
and Ross and the federal cases on
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which that decision was founded.
In Baldwin v. State, 45 Md. App. 378,
413 A.2d 246 (1980) (hereinafter cited
as Baldwin) Judge Gilbert again deviates
from the path laid out by the Court of
Appeals and the Maryland Wiretap Act,
marking his route with the signpostP.I.P .... He explains his framework
thus:
The first part, known as the
pre-intercept stage, requires, under
Siegel and its progeny, strict compliance with the Md. Cts. and
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. (1980 Rep.
Vol.)
10-401 through 10-412.
The second part may be characterized as the interception or on-going
phase, at which time the law
enforcement agency actually conducts the electronic interception
of the communication. The
second phase also necessitates
that there not be the slightest
deviation from the letter of the
act. The third part is stylistically
known as the post-interception phase.
It dictates what is to be done after
the interception has been completed. Violation of the latter
does not mandate suppression of
the evidence derived from the
interception, unless the party
whose communication was intercepted can show that he has been
prejudiced by the non-compliance
with the statute. Spease v. State,
supra. Thus, aware of P.I.P.-i.e.,
pre-interception and post
interception,-we turn our attention to the instant case. Baldwin at
381-382, 413 A.2d at 249.
Just how this framework was applied in Baldwin is a matter for speculation. After deciding that the order of
authorization must contain a designation of intervals at which reports
must be made to the issuing judge
(clearly a pre-intercept matter), Judge
Gilbert finds an intercept stage violation to which he applies a strict compliance standard. It is unclear from
the opinion what intercept stage violation occurred.
In January of 1981, the Court of
Appeals issued its opinion in State- v.
Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 433 A.2d 1021
(1981) (hereinafter cited as Bailey).

In affirming the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals, the Court
of Appeals in State v. Baldwin, 289 Md.
635, 426 A.2d 916 (1981), (hereinafter cited as State v. Baldwin), clearly
rejected the P.I.P. analytical framework. After referring to the harmonizing of Spease and Ross and Siegel, the
Court of Appeals in Baldwin v. State
stated:
There the Court harmonized Siegel,
with Spease and Ross, in a significantly
different manner than did the Court
of Special Appeals in Poore, saying:
The difference between the
two cases is clear. The statutory
provisions which require the
wiretap order to conform to specific minimum guidelines are
those which the legislature perceives to contain minimum safeguards to constitutional rights.
Once the directives of the statute
have been met and a valid order
has been issued, compliance, at
least in the area of minimization
of unauthorized communications
and service of inventory, can be
judged by a more lenient substantial compliance standard. Bailey,
supra, at 153-54, 422 A.2d at 1027.
The Court comes very close to declaring the federal standard of analysis
expressed in U.S. v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413 (1977); U.S. v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505 (1974); and U.S. v. Chavez, 416 U.S.

562 (1974). It cannot fully adopt that
standard, however, because Maryland,
in requiring strict compliance in obtaining and issuing an order, has adopted
a more stringent standard by statute.
The Wiretapping Act at

10-408 (i) (ii).

The Court of Appeals is typically
cautious, restricting the scope of its
analysis to "minimization of unauthorized communication and service of
inventory..." Bailey, supra at 154, 422
A.2d at 1027. The implications, however, are clear. According to the Court
of Appeals, there are two phases to
consider in a wiretap case-preauthorization, where strict compliance is
mandated; and post-authorization,
where substantial compliance may be
sufficient.

The establishment of these
intervals by the issuing judge is
essential to safeguard against
unwarranted intrusions on personal privacy rights, and, unlike
the situation in Spease and Ross, is
central to the statutory schemea precondition to the issuance of
a valid order, as in Siegel and Bailey. It is clear to us that the Maryland Legislature, in enacting the
provision of 10-408 (i) that suppression was an appropriate
remedy where the order of interception was not issued "in strict
compliance" with the Act,
intended to adopt the Siegel standard to govern violations of preconditions to the issuance of a
valid order. Id. at 643-44, 639-49,
426 A.2d at 921-22.
The Court of Appeals is slowly but
surely smoothing over the ruts left in
the road by the Court of Special
Appeals. The analysis applied in Baldwin v. State is somewhat strained. Unlike
provisions required by statute to be
included in the order of authorization
such as that omitted in Bailey, which
were clearly preauthorization, the
failure of an issuing judge to designate reporting intervals after the order
is signed is not so easily categorized.
The Court seems to conclude that,
because the establishment of reporting intervals ". . .is essential to safeguard against unwarranted intrusions
on personal privacy rights..." and"...
is central to statutory scheme. .. ", it

is therefore a pre-authorization
requirement. Baldwin v. State at 643,
426 A.2d at 922. These two factors do
not, however, necessarily lead to the
conclusion reached. The more logical
test to determine whether a matter is
pre-authorization or post-authori-
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zation is whether it may occur before
or after issuance of the order. Under
the Court of Appeals State v. Baldwin
standard, the judge may designate
reporting intervals after the order
itself is issued. Thus, at least in a
mechanical sense, the designation of
reporting intervals is a post-authorization matter.
At this point it is important to recall
that the Court has not drawn a bright
line categorically requiring a substantial compliance test for post-authorization matters. The language used,
both in Spease and Ross, and Bailey, was
permissive-substantial compliance
may be permitted with regard to postauthorization requirements.
It was, therefore, not necessary for
the Court to force the designation of
reporting intervals into the pre-authorization mold. It could have determined
that, with regard to post-authorization
matters, a substantialcompliance test would
be applied unless the requirement
was "...essential to safeguard against
unwarranted intrusions on personal
privacy rights and... [was] central to
the statutory scheme." State v. Baldwin
at 643, 426 A.2d at 922. This reasoning satisfies the stringent strict compliance mandate of the MarylandWiretap
Act, and provides a reasonable standard for determining whether strict or
substantial compliance should be required for particular post-authorization matters. It eliminates the danger
of breaking the mold which was only
bent by the Chief Appeals in State v.
Baldwin. This approach would be both
consistent with the statutory scheme
and would provide a substantive rather
than a mechanical test in this area,
which so greatly affects fundamental
principles of privacy.
Hopefully, this is an accurate map
of the path the Court of Appeals has
followed, and a correct prognostication as to its ultimate destination.
However, until the Court explicitly
rejects the three-phase framework
set forth by the Court of Special
Appeals in Baldwin, and develops a
comprehensive substantive test to
determine when substantial compliance will be permitted, the electronic
surveillance road in Maryland is likely
to remain rocky.
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